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Abstract. The reliability of the “Internet Census 2012” (IC), an anony-
mously published scan of the entire IPv4 address space, is not a priori
clear. As a step towards validation of this dataset, we compare it to
logged reference data on a /16 network, and present an approach to sys-
tematically handle uncertainties in timestamps in the IC and reference
data. We find evidence the scan indeed took place, and a 93% match
with the /16 reference data.
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1 Introduction
In March 2013, an anonymous researcher published the result of a project called
Internet Census 2012 (IC) [2]. The project was based on a scan of the entire
IPv4 addresses space (i.e., an Internet-wide scan). A scan is created by sending
probe packets to hosts, using one probing host or a distributed network of hosts
controlled by a central server. Technical issues that could prevent accurate re-
sults are packet loss, or bot misconfiguration. The anonymous author claims his
9 Tbytes of raw log files are the most recent and accurate census of the Internet.
Active scans on the Internet are certainly an important source of information,
as several studies have demonstrated that they can help reveal new kinds of vul-
nerabilities, monitor deployment of mitigation, and highlight hidden distributed
ecosystems [5, 6, 7, 8, 11]. However, the IC results were published anonymously,
and the methodology only partially described, which, as pointed out by the Co-
operative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [1], leads to some
important questions, such as: how does one know that the IC scan actually
happened, and if it did, how does one know that the resulting data is correct?
In this paper we extend the work of CAIDA [1] by proposing a methodology
to validate the Internet Census in third-party networks and datasets. We then
applied our methodology to the /16 network address block of the University of
Twente (UT), and found a match of about 93% between the considered Internet
Census data and our reference data.
The scientific community has ethical (and legal) concerns about the IC. There
are concerns about network-wide scanning in general; discussions so far have not
led to clear concensus. In the case of the IC, this is exacerbated by the fact that
A. Gravey, Y. Kermarrec (Eds.) 1 EUNICE 2014
2. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
the IC was performed using a botnet consisting of around 420 thousand compro-
mised systems. In this paper, we sidestep these concerns by limiting ourselves
to comparing this dataset to reference data of our own, with the sole purpose of
finding out to what extent the IC dataset actually reflects reality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses re-
lated work, and is followed by a characterization of the IC dataset in Section 3.
Section 4 describes our proposed methodology, which is analyzed in Section 5.
Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our findings and highlight future work.
2 Related work and Background
Since the beginning of the Internet, scans have been performed to obtain infor-
mation about the end hosts. RFC-832 [12] describes the first documented scan
of the Internet. At that time, in 1982, 315 hosts were probed to see if they use
the TCP protocol. The scan took roughly one day.
In [6], Heidemann et al. presented a study of the active Internet over the pe-
riod 2003–2008. The presented census highlighted anomalies in the un-allocated
address space and indicates the percentage of usage for allocated network blocks.
The observations from this scan were validated by comparing them to scans of
smaller address blocks. This study only considers ICMP probes, as TCP is con-
sidered too resource-consuming for the scanned hosts.
Furthermore, Holz et al. conducted HTTPs scans of the top million popular
hosts over a timespan of 1.5 years [9]. These scans were horizontal, as only port
443 was probed, scanning for certificates. The IC differs by probing the top 100
and several other random ports.
Another Internet-wide scan which is similar to the IC was performed by Du-
rumeric et al. [4]. To the best of our knowledge, it is the most recent documented
scan of the complete Internet. The authors developed a scanning tool, ZMap,
specifically designed to perform fast scans at a large scale. Differently from the
IC, the scans performed by Durumeric et al. are targeted at the study of spe-
cific protocols, showing that the authors are cautious to avoid more scanning
activities than needed.
Internet-wide scans are unfortunately not only used for Internet measure-
ments. In [3], Dainotti et al. describe a scan of the entire IPv4 address space
performed by the Sality botnet. It is estimated that the botnet has scanned ap-
proximately 3 million distinct IP addresses over a period of 12 days, scanning
both port 5060 (SIP) and port 80.
3 Characterization of Internet Census 2012
The dataset provided by the IC is composed of seven sets of traces, as summa-
rized in Table 1. Each entry of each trace contains three elements: 1) the IP
address of the probed device, 2) a timestamp indicating the moment of probing,
and 3) the result of the scan, which depends on the scan method used in each
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Table 1. Traces in IC
# Trace Content Size
1 ICMP Ping Responsiveness and latencies 1.8 TB
2 Reverse DNS DNS records 366 GB
3 Serviceprobes Services behind open ports 5.5 TB
4 Hostprobes Responsiveness 771 GB
5 Syncscan State of ports 435 GB
6 TCP/IP Fingerprint Type of device and operating system 50 GB
7 Traceroute Path of data packet 18 GB
trace. For example, the ICMP scan indicates if a host is reachable, while the
Synscan trace lists the status of the scanned ports.
In our research, the traces ‘icmp_ping’, ‘hostprobes’ and ‘syncscan’ are of
special interest, because these traces indicate if a device was active or not at a
certain timestamp. These three traces will be the only traces considered in the
following sections.
3.1 Trace overview
Figure 1 shows the time distribution of the probes that reached the UT /16
netblock accordingly to the IC. They are clustered in three main periods, namely
April–July 2012, August–October 2012 and mid-December 2012. IP address are
generally probed more than once per trace, as shown in Figure 2. The x-axis of
this figure is the number of probes sent to an IP address, while the y-axis the
respective frequencies. For example, in the hostprobes trace more than 35000 IP
addresses were probed five times. In the syncscan, most IP addresses are probed
only once or twice, while icmp_ping has around 13 probes per IP address.
3.2 Timestamp rounding
The IC paper does not much provide information about the probe timestamps
reported in the datasets. Based on the format, the timestamps used in the IC
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Fig. 1. Number of probes per day for 130.89.0.0/16
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Fig. 2. Occurence frequency of the number of probes per IP address
are assumed to be in standard Unix time format (i.e., seconds since Jan. 1,
1970). The source of the timestamping is unclear: they might be the probing
bots themselves, or some central server collecting the data. Especially in the
former case, timestamps may be off and inconsistent due to the respective bot’s
clock not being set correctly.
Furthermore, it is notable that each timestamp value in the IC is an odd
multiple of 900 seconds; in other words, each timestamp is either exactly 15
minutes before or after a full hour. Apparently, the actual timestamps of the
probes have been rounded in some way, presumably for anonimization. The
rounding strategy is not described; obvious possibilities are always up, always
down, or to nearest. This leads to a total uncertainty of 3600 seconds, ranging
from 1800 seconds before the IC timestamp to 1800 seconds after it. We will
take this observation into account in the validation of the IC traces performed
in Sections 4 and 5.
4 Methodology
Our validation methodology consists of two parts. First, we verify that probes
from the IC have indeed reached hosts at the UT. We do this by analysing packet
traces that were collected at the time of the scan for a particular IP address.
Secondly, we validate the information of the IC for the /16 netblock of the UT,
which we indicate as ICUT , by comparing the IC traces with a reference dataset
based on the ARP tables of the UT routers.
4.1 Single-IP analysis
For the single-IP analysis, the trace of all incoming traffic to a server at the
UT is compared with the IC data. (We only had such a trace available for a
single machine.) The best trace of the IC to use for this goal is the syncscan
trace, because of its many probes in a short time interval. The hostprobes and
icmp_ping IC traces are not inspected, because, due to the timestamp rounding
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Table 2. Overall comparison of the ARP and ICUT datasets
Subset Definition Description
Subset A ARP − ICUT UT IP addresses are active but not included in the IC
Subset B ARP ∩ ICUT UT IP addresses are active and included in the IC
Subset C ICUT −ARP UT IP addresses are not active but included in the IC
and the frequency of ICMP packets in the host trace, it was not possible to
match ICMP packets in the trace to the IC with certainty. From the syncscan
trace the probed ports and the time of probing are known. This is enough data
to filter the IC probes from other incoming traffic at the server. To validate
each entry that corresponds to the analysed IP, we consider the following: first,
it is checked if the machine was actually approached by the IC at the stated
timestamp; second, the state that was reported in the IC is checked to be equal
to the actual state of the machine.
4.2 UT address block analysis
Reference dataset To validate the IC data, we need a reference dataset indi-
cating, for a certain moment in time, which IP addresses are active in the /16
UT networks. The dataset used in this paper is a consolidated snapshot of the
ARP table of the UT routers, referred as ARP , during the period April 2012–
December 2012. From the analysis of the ARP tables we determine that the UT
/16 block has a utilization of about 53%. We are aware that the ARP tables can
introduce some measurement imprecisions. For example, an IP would typically
remain in the ARP tables for some time after it has disconnected. Furthermore,
several gaps in the dataset are present, due to SNMP timeouts that occurred
or because the database table space was temporarily full. However, considering
that we are analyzing IC data over a period of 8 months, we believe that these
imprecisions only have a limited impact on the validation.
We first investigate the intersection and, respectively left and right difference
between the IP sets in ICUT and ARP , as indicated in Table 2. Subsets A and C
report errors in the IC, namely active IP addressed that have not been reported
or, conversely, inactive IP addresses that have been wrongly included in the IC.
In the case of Subset B, we proceed as described in the following subsection.
Subset B timestamp analysis Although in principle Subset B is the inter-
section of ICUT and ARP , this is not sufficient to state that these IP addresses
are correctly reported. For example, an IP could have been listed in the IC at
a moment in time in which it was not active, or viceversa. To investigate this
issue, we perform the following analysis on the ARP and IC timestamps.
First, we consider the complete interval in which the IC probe can be sent.
Due to the timestamp rounding in the IC, every timestamp t is expanded to
create an interval with start time t−1800 sec and end time t+1800 sec. For the
ARP tables this is not necessary, since they already report the start and end time
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of activity for a certain IP. Comparing the interval of the ARP table with the
interval of the IC will result in four possible outcomes, referred as overlaptypes
(see Figure 3) with four different conclusions.
Type
1 - No overlap
2 - Partial overlap
3 - Total trace overlap
4 - Total reg. overlap
A B
A B
Interval positions
ARP
IC
Fig. 3. Different overlap possibilities.
No overlap: This situation occurs when an IP address was registered ac-
cording to the ARP table, but the IC probed the IP address outside the ARP
interval. Therefore, the IC should not state this IP address as being alive.
Partial overlap: If the intervals overlap only partially, it is not clear whether
the probe was sent within or outside the ARP registration interval, so no con-
clusion can be drawn.
Total IC overlap: In this case, the IC interval is completely contained in the
ARP registration interval. The information in the IC must therefore contain
an indication of the IP address being alive. If the IC states that the host is
unreachable, this is an error.
Total IC overlap: The last case is characterized by the ARP registration
interval being completely overlapped by the IC trace interval. The IC trace
interval itself is partially overlapped, so it is not clear whether the probe was
sent within or outside the ARP registration interval and no conclusion can be
drawn.
Validation In this study, we focus in particular on the erroneous entries in the
IC, because they are an indication of the reliability of the IC. An erroneous entry
is defined as an entry that contradicts the data in the ARP tables of the UT.
Basically, the comparison consists of the following steps, which will be elab-
orated further on:
– Split the IC trace into unreachable and alive subtraces; this step is necessary
to correctly analyze the IPs in Subset B.
– Determine the appropriate subset for each entry.
– Count probes per subset.
In order to clarify the comparison in a more visual way, we refer the reader
to the flowchart in Figure 4. This figure shows how an IC probe is categorized
in a certain subset. Furthermore, it shows what type of IC probes are erroneous,
as can be deduced from Section 4.2.
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the comparison process
5 Results
Similar to Section 4, the results are described in two parts and ordered in the
same way, first the single-IP analysis is discussed, followed by the results of the
/16 address block analysis.
5.1 Single-IP analysis results
Performing the method described in Section 4.1 on the given traces, results in
the conclusion that the IC records concerning the server correspond to the traffic
traces of our server. Indeed, the IP of the server turns out to be present in the
IC records of the syncscan trace. Furthermore, in the incoming traffic of the
server packets have been identified that match the timestamp and portnumbers
listed for scans of this machine in the IC. As an aside, it turns out that when the
IC scanned several ports within a short timeframe (same rounded timestamp),
these scans came from the same IP address, while scans farther apart came from
different IP addresses. Most probes were replied to with a packet having the
RST and ACK flags set, revealing that the probed host exists but has these
ports closed. These ports of the server IP were marked as ‘closed’ in the IC,
which is as expected. One port was correctly marked as open in the IC. In
the remaining cases, the IC marks ports for our IP as ‘filtered’, and indeed no
corresponding incoming sync packet could be found.
By comparing the timestamps of the packet traces of the single host to the
probe timestamps in the IC, the rounding of IC timestamps can be studied. It
turns out that the timestamps in the IC are between 200 and 900 seconds lower
than the timestamps in the packet trace. From this we can conclude that out
of the three options mentioned in 3.2, only the round “always down” and “to
nearest” are compatible with the data. (Note that we could distinguish between
these remaining two options if we had timestamps in the first or third quarter
of the hour, but apparently our server was only probed in the second and fourth
quarter of the hour.) Although we only have this data of one IP and one trace, it
is assumed that all timestamps in the IC are rounded the same way. In principle,
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this reduces the timestamp uncertainty from 3600 seconds as discussed in 3.2,
to 2700 seconds. However, in Section 4.2 we have used the original 3600 second
uncertainty, both because 2700 s provides only a small advantage and for lack
of time to redo the entire analysis.
By inspecting the packet traces of the host considered in this study, we
observe the following:
– When the probed host replies by sending a packet with flags [RST,ACK] set,
the IC reports a closed state accordingly.
– When the IC probe does not reach the probed host, the IC reports a filtered
state accordingly.
– When the IC probe reaches the probed host and the host does not reply but
drops the probe, the IC reports a filtered state accordingly.
– Some ports are probed multiple times.
Since each probe of our server in the IC, reporting a different state than
filtered, indeed can be matched to a packet in our trace, we can conclude that
the scan did indeed happen (confirming findings of [1]), and did indeed reach
our network. Furthermore, we have obtained partial knowledge of the timestamp
rounding.
5.2 /16 address block analysis results
In conformity with the division in subsets of Section 4.2, the results of the
/16 address block analysis are split in three parts, because each of these parts
requires a different analysis. The result of the interval comparison in subset B is
an overview of the occurrence of different overlaptypes described in Figure 3.
Subset A All hosts registered in the ARP tables were present in icmp_ping and
hostprobes traces, resulting in an empty subset A for these traces. By analysing
the comparison of the syncscan trace, 71.4% of the IPs in ARP do not appear in
the ICUT . Since the author of the IC paper states that a syncscan was limited
to about 660 million IP addresses [2], we consider our observation in line with
the IC description.
Subset C The percentage of the entries in subset C with respect to the total
probes in each subtrace (e.g. hostprobes_alive or icmp_unreachable) is shown
in the first column of Table 3.
According to the characteristics described in Section 4.2, no IC entries marked
as alive should be in this subset. As shown in Table 3, the alive subtraces of host-
probes, icmp_ping and syncscan contain 5.31%, 2.82%, and 3.94% respectively
nonmatching IP addresses. These are considered erroneous. However, further
analysis shows that several alive IP addresses of trace icmp_ping that are cate-
gorized in this subset are actually broadcast addresses or network addresses. The
UT has about 200 of these addresses in the /16 address block. These addresses
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are categorized in subset C, because they are not included in the ARP table
of the UT. The IC reported these addresses as alive, due to the reply of some
UT routers that received the probe. In addition, several hosts reported as alive
in this subset were probed close in time to moments where ARP table errors
occurred. This can be another reason why some IP addresses in the /16 address
block that were alive according to the IC are not present in the ARP table. From
this observation is concluded that alive entries in this subset are not necessarily
errors in the IC.
Figure 5 shows that more than 50% of the probes in the unreachable subtraces
of hostprobes and icmp_ping do not match the IP addresses of the ARP table.
These probes are consistent with the ARP data, due to the fact that IP addresses
can not be alive without them being registered in the ARP table. Hence these
probes are considered correct.
Subset B By categorizing the records of subset B into separate overlaptypes,
the validity of each subtrace can be determined. The result is a table with the
number of probes that is counted for each overlaptype, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Result of comparison per subtrace of IC with ARP table
Subset C Subset B Total
Subtrace noipmatch no_overlap partial_overlap totaltraceoverlap totalregoverlap
hostprobes_alive 1192 [5.31%] 1573 [7.01%] 411 [1.83%] 18945 [84.46%] 311 [1.39%] 22432
hostprobes_unreachable 170565 [55.80%] 118078 [38.63%] 2775 [0.91%] 13481 [4.41%] 769 [0.25%] 305668
icmp_alive 1497 [2.82%] 1010 [1.90%] 1176 [2.22%] 48406 [91.30%] 930 [1.75%] 53019
icmp_unreachable 458833 [55.27%] 310824 [37.44%] 8688 [1.05%] 49048 [5.91%] 2721 [0.33%] 830114
syncscan_alive 670 [3.94%] 839 [4.94%] 264 [1.55%] 14930 [87.90%] 282 [1.66%] 16985
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
noipmatch no_overlap partial_overlap totaltraceoverlap totalregoverlap
CD
F
Overlaptypes
hostprobes alive
hostprobes unreachable
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Fig. 5. Cumulative Distribution Function of overlaptypes in subtraces
Figure 5 shows the same data as Table 3, but now as a cumulative distri-
bution function. On the x-axis are the possible overlaptypes, ordered roughly
by increasing quality of the match; the y-axis displays the percentage of probes
having up to that kind of match. The following two paragraphs summarize the
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observed distribution of the subtraces based on the probe states. Errors and
correctness are discussed afterwards.
Unreachable As seen in Figure 5, the largest increase of the unreachable subtraces
occurs in between overlaptypes noipmatch and no_overlap. Because these traces
add up to more than 90% of all probes in these traces, we can conclude that
most of these probes did indeed not reach active hosts. About these probed IP
addresses it can be said that their unreachable state is noted correctly in the IC.
Alive Another observation from Figure 5 is the large percentage of the total-
traceoverlap in traces hostprobes_alive, icmp_alive, shown by a clear increase
from overlaptype partial_overlap to totaltraceoverlap. The share of total probes
in these subtraces in overlaptype totaltraceoverlap of subset B is 84.46% and
91.30% respectively. The probes of these traces in this category are correct. A
similar percentage of 87.90% totaltraceoverlap is observed in the syncscan_alive
subtrace.
Trace correctness In order to give an overall correctness indication for each
IC trace for this /16 block, we take together the statistics for the unreachable
and the alive subtraces of each trace. The cases which are counted as correct are
marked green in Table 3: unreachable and either noipmatch or no_overlap, or
alive and totaltraceoverlap. The cases which are counted as incorrect are marked
red in the table: alive and either noipmatch or no_overlap, or unreachable and
totaltraceoverlap. In the remaining cases, no correctness conclusion can be drawn
due to the timestamp uncertainties. Thus, we cannot calculate the overall cor-
rectness percentage as a single value, but as a range to represent the uncertain
cases.
A further difficulty occurs in the case of the syncscan trace: here we only
have an alive subtrace and not an unreachable subtrace. This is because when a
port was found not reachable, the IC reports it as ‘filtered’, indicating that the
host may actually have been alive, but unreachable due to a filter on the path.
Comparing this to our reference data of alive hosts clearly is not meaningful.
Finally, this results in the correctness ranges of each IC trace. Regarding
hostprobes, the correctness is in between 93.75%–95.05%. For icmp_ping this
correctness is equal to 92.63%–94.16% and in syncscan, 40.69%–95.89% is cor-
rect. The rather low lower bound in the latter case is because for we could only
check the alive subtrace, as explained above.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have validated a /16 block from the “Internet Census 2012”
by comparing it to locally logged data from that /16 block, and introduced a
method to deal with the uncertainties in both the timestamps of the IC and the
reference data.
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Using the incoming traffic traces of a single host, it was validated that the
IC scan included devices in the /16 address block of the UT. We were able to
identify the syncscan probes of the IC in the normal server traffic, which is a
strong indication that the IC indeed was performed on the UT network. We
showed that the syncscan probe timestamps were either rounded down or to
nearest with respect to the probe timestamp as observed on our server.
After verifying that the scan has taken place at the UT network, our analysis
of the complete UT /16 address block has shown that about 93% of the IP
addresses utilization in this block are correctly reported by the IC, by comparing
them to logged ARP tables. Although this results indicates that the census has
the possibility of depicting an accurate picture of the Internet utilization, it is
also important to notice that, on a large scale this potentially amount to several
millions of incorrectly classified hosts. Also, we reckon that the accuracy could
be influenced by specific network settings, therefore we do not extrapolate from
these results to wider conclusions.
Many error sources could have affected the IC scan when it was performed.
Some of the possible error causes might be packet loss or bot misconfiguration.
Missing information could for example lead to an incorrect unreachable state of
an IP address in the IC. In contrast to the hostprobes and icmp_ping traces, the
syncscan trace has only been validated for about 40%. Many probes of this trace
were ignored in the process, e.g. UDP probes and probes that have the state
‘filtered’ in the IC. Therefore, we consider this result as not really accurate and
think it should not be used as a measure for correctness of the entire syncscan
trace.
There are several opportunities for future work. By using traces of incoming
traffic of more hosts, if available, the rounding method of the IC timestamps
can be identified, and the accuracy of the timestamps studied further. If the
rounding method is known, the accuracy of the proposed validation method can
be increased. Furthermore, other address blocks of the IPv4 address space can
be validated using the proposed method. When more address blocks in the IC
are validated, a better conclusion about the validity of the entire IC can be
drawn. Another possibility for future research is the validation of IC traces that
were skipped in our research. The serviceprobes and tcp_ip_fingerprint traces
for example contain Nmap data about the devices that were scanned.
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